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Abstract
Previous theoretical studies on the debt shifting behavior of multinationals have
assumed a±liates of multinationals to be wholly owned. We develop a model that
allows a multinational ¯rm to determine both the leverage and ownership structure
in a±liates endogenously. A main ¯nding is that a±liates with minority owners
have less debt than wholly owned a±liates and therefore a less tax-e±cient ¯nancing
structure. This is due to an externality that arises endogenously in our model, where
costs and bene¯ts of debt shifting are shared asymmetrically between minority and
majority owners. Our ¯ndings provide a theory framework for recent empirical
¯ndings.
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It is well known that multinationals can use internal debt to save tax payments by
utilizing di®erences in national tax rates.1 The mechanism at play under debt shifting
is that interest income is earned in low-tax countries and deducted in high-tax countries
so that the tax savings arising from the deductions in high-tax countries exceed the
corresponding tax payments in low-tax countries. Previous literature has studied debt
shifting when a±liates of multinationals are wholly owned.2 Multinationals, however,
often have the option to own 100%, the majority, or to be in a minority position in
(newly created) foreign entities. Empirical evidence shows that all three combinations
of ownership structures are selected,3 and there is therefore a need for a theory that
can explain how di®erent ownership structures a®ect tax-e±cient ¯nancing structures in
multinationals.
This paper presents a theory model that determines jointly the ownership structure
and ¯nancing structure in a±liates of multinational ¯rms. We show that a±liates of
multinationals with minority owners have less internal debt and a di®erent ¯nancing
structure than do a±liates of multinationals that are wholly owned. The intuition is
that (local) minority owners bene¯t from a classical free-riding externality related to
the use of internal debt. Minority owners bene¯t in full from tax planning strategies
involving internal debt, but they do not fully share the related ¯nancing costs. This is so
because the tax savings in borrowing a±liates bene¯t minority owners in proportion to
their equity share. However, the corresponding lending transactions give rise to interest
revenues and tax payments in the multinational's ¯nancial center where minority owners
who bene¯t from the tax deductions do not hold equity. Minority owners do not hold
equity in lending a±liates because it is not pro¯table for them to do so. It is this
asymmetric sharing of costs and bene¯ts between minority and majority owners, which
arises endogenously in our model, that leads to the externality. This result, which has not
been shown before, provides a theoretical explanation for recent empirical ¯ndings where
a±liates with minority owners have been shown to have a less tax sensitive debt-to-asset
ratio than wholly owned a±liates (see section 2).
In a second step of the analysis, we use the result that a±liates with minority owners
use less internal debt to show that the e®ective rental rate of capital is higher in such
a±liates. All else equal, this makes it less attractive to share equity. We also show that
an optimal ¯nancing structure (independently of ownership shares) implies that a±liates
1Empirical studies on European and U.S. data have documented that multinationals structure their
leverage so as to minimize tax payments globally. See Barion et al. (2010), Egger et al. (2010), BÄ uttner
et al. (2009), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), and Desai et al. (2004a).
2See e.g., Mintz (2004) and Mintz and Smart (2004). A survey of the literature is provided by Mintz
and Weichenrieder (2010).
3For evidence on ownership structure in the U.S. see Desai et al. (2004b), and for German multina-
tionals see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005).
2of multinationals have higher internal and overall debt ratios as well as lower e®ective
rental rates of physical capital than comparable domestic ¯rms, and that they have a
more capital-intensive production structure.
Our results emerge from a model where a headquarters of a multinational ¯rm decides
both on ownership and ¯nancing structure of its a±liates. The headquarters, in its
decision making about whether or not to share equity, balances costs and gains from
sharing equity.4 The bene¯ts of forming a joint venture are related to fundamentals such
as cost reductions (or increased productivity), whilst the costs pertain to the coordination
of worldwide debt shifting activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys some of the related
literature. Section 3 describes the basic framework and discusses the basis for cooperation
and the use of debt. Section 4 derives the optimal ¯nancing and investment choices for the
multinational ¯rm, while section 5 derives optimal ownership shares. Section 6 provides
a discussion of our ¯ndings, and section 7 o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Our main ¯nding that a±liates of multinationals with minority owners have less internal
debt and are less tax sensitive has been documented in several studies. BÄ uttner and
Wamser (2007) use the German MiDi (Bundesbank) data base and ¯nd that minority
ownership exerts a negative (level) e®ect on the use of internal debt. In particular, they
¯nd that the leverage ratio of internal debt is 5 (respectively 2) percentage points higher
in wholly owned (respectively partially-owned) subsidiaries compared to non-majority
owned ones (BÄ uttner and Wamser, 2007, p. 22). With respect to the tax sensitivity of
internal debt, Hebous and Weichenrieder (2010) ¯nd that a 10% increase in the corporate
tax rate in emerging markets increases the ratio of debt-to-assets of wholly owned a±liates
of multinationals by 27 percentage points. In contrast, they cannot ¯nd any evidence of
debt shifting for partially owned a±liates. Such marked di®erences in behavior between
partially and wholly owned a±liates are also obtained by Weichenrieder (2009), BÄ uttner
and Wamser (2007), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), and Desai et al. (2004b) studying
a±liates of German and U.S. multinationals.
Desai et al. (2004b) analyze the determinants of partial ownership of the foreign
a±liates of U.S. multinationals and in particular the marked decline in the use of joint
ventures over a 20-year period. Their analysis is empirical and suggests that there is
an increased appetite for control by multinational parents. They attribute this to three
4Our modeling approach relates to the literature on costs and bene¯ts of co-ownership. See Williamson
(1975), Holmstrom (1982), Svejnar and Smith (1984), Grossman and Hart (1986), Gomes-Casseres
(1989), and Ramachandran (1993). However, we neglect costs and bene¯ts of asymmetric information
related to time-consistent taxation as in Konrad and Lommerud (2001).
3di®erent types of coordination costs. First, costly con°icts may arise between minor-
ity owners and multinational enterprises, since multinationals have an incentive to shift
pro¯ts away from a±liates with minority owners. Second, multinationals run the risk
of having their technology appropriated by local partners. Finally, multinationals have
a desire to structure production worldwide and this desire holds the potential for con-
°ict with minority owners. Our analysis is related to Desai et al. (2004b) in that we
show there is a fourth cost element at play namely a ¯scal externality related to minority
ownership and debt shifting that makes it more attractive to wholly own a±liates.5
Our analysis is also linked to the transfer pricing literature and the corporate gov-
ernance literature, where a major concern has been that majority owners would exploit
minority owners. For example, in the transfer pricing literature it has been shown that
minority ownership gives the headquarters of a multinational ¯rm incentives to shift in-
come away from minority owners by mispricing intra-¯rm transactions (Kant, 1988, 1990;
Bertrand et al., 2002). The reason is that minority ownership works like a pro¯t tax in
the sense that the multinational keeps only a fraction of the a±liate's income. The trans-
fer pricing literature, therefore, ¯nds that minority ownership aggravates the incentives
for trade mispricing and leads to more tax evasion.6 In a similar fashion, one would ex-
pect that minority ownership should increase tax planning by debt. Our result, however,
is the opposite. Minority ownership leads to less tax planning, since the multinational
¯rm dampens the externality from joint ownership by shifting less debt. The economic
reasoning, however, is the same as in the transfer pricing literature. In both cases the
multinational ¯rm would like to avoid sharing pro¯t income with minority owners.
Debt shifting in wholly owned a±liates of multinationals is investigated by Mintz and
Smart (2004). They study corporate income taxation when ¯rms operating in multiple
jurisdictions can shift income by lending among a±liates, and show that debt shifting
a®ects real investment, government income, and tax base elasticities. They test their
model on Canadian data ¯nding support for the hypothesis that this type of income
shifting has pronounced e®ects on provincial tax bases. Related to this study is Mintz
(2004), who investigates how a multinational parent can use conduit companies to create
a chain of companies for the purpose of shifting funds and claiming deduction of interest
at least twice.7
More recently, Barion et al. (2010) use a dynamic trade-o® model that describes a
multinational's ¯nancing strategies in wholly owned a±liates and test their model on
5As pointed out by one of our referees, a possible ¯fth explanation for the appetite of control may be
that parent ¯rms (in the case of co-owners) do not want to inject internal debt that acts like equity, but
grants no voting rights.
6Manipulation of transfer prices for the purpose of shifting pro¯t income is according to most OECD
countries' legislation an illegal activity (tax evasion).
7See also Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) for a more elaborate model of holding companies and
ownership chains. Less related but in the same vein are Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) who study pro¯t
shifting through thin capitalization in a setting of tax competition.
4European data. A main ¯nding is that subsidiaries' leverage increases with the statutory
tax rate in the host country, but that this e®ect is dampened the higher the tax rate in
the country where the parent ¯rm is located. In the same vein, Weichenrieder (2009)
uses a model where a±liates may share equity and shift pro¯t by transfer pricing. Using
German data on inbound and outbound FDI, he ¯nds a strong empirical correlation
between the home country tax rate of the parent and the net pro¯tability of its German
a±liate that is consistent with pro¯t shifting behavior.
3 The Model
We consider a multinational ¯rm (henceforth MNC) where the headquarters (henceforth
HQ) decides on the leverage structure and investments in n countries. When investing,
the HQ must decide whether or not to let some or all of its a±liates share equity. Minority
owners may be local investors, local ¯rms or another multinational ¯rm.
In general, partial ownership may be exogenously or endogenously determined. An
example of the former is legal requirements where a country requires a certain local
ownership stake as is the case in China.8 Endogenous minority ownership depends on
the costs and bene¯ts of cooperation between a local ¯rm and the MNC. The gains from
forming a joint venture may be related to the fact that local ¯rms have more experience
in their local markets (familiarity with local customs, network connections etc.), whilst
MNCs may have an edge in terms of industry-speci¯c skills developed in their worldwide
operations. As a whole, bene¯ts from minority ownership may be in the form of a cost
saving and/or as a rise in productivity or sales relative to a wholly owned operation.9
We shall assume that the basis for cooperation is cost savings, but we show in an
appendix that allowing the bene¯ts of cooperation to be productivity enhancing does not
a®ect our results qualitatively. We model cost savings by assuming that there are market
entry costs CM
















In each a±liate, the MNC employs Ki units of capital and Li units of labor in order
to produce F(Ki;Li) units of an homogenous output good whose price is normalized to
one. The production function F(Ki;Li) exhibits positive and decreasing returns to each
input, i.e., Fa > 0 and Faa < 0 for a 2 fKi;Lig. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile
and the rental cost of capital per unit is r > 0 and is assumed to be ¯xed (i.e., the usual
8See Kant (1995) for a discussion of exogenous ownership requirements.
9Note that a joint venture may di®er from a M&A. A joint venture has a local partner whereas an
acquired ¯rm is a foreign ¯rm. This may a®ect how local ¯rms and customers act towards the ¯rm. It
may also be the case that a M&A may a®ect goodwill and political support by the hosting government
to a di®erent degree than if the ¯rm is a joint venture.
5small country assumption). A ¯xed interest rate means that we do not model market
imperfections such as weak creditor rights or shallow capital markets. Our focus here is
on how tax incentives a®ect capital structure in joint ventures when capital markets are
well functioning.
The ¯rm ¯nances its investments in country i by equity Ei or debt Di. In setting up
a±liate i as a joint venture, equity is shared with minority owners, i.e., the MNC injects
(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ Ei units of equity and minority shareholders contribute Ji ¢ Ei units. Debt










, where internal debt is
obtained by borrowing from related a±liates. We de¯ne Ki as the total capital employed
by a±liate i; and let ®i = DE
i =Ki be the external debt to capital ratio, and ¾i = DI
i=Ki
the internal debt to capital ratio. The overall leverage ratio of the ¯rm can be expressed






=Ki: Within the MNC, it must be the case that the sum of








¾i ¢ r ¢ Ki = 0:
We follow most of the literature on debt structure by assuming that there are costs
per unit capital associated with borrowing that are given by the function C = C(®i;¾i):10
For internal debt, these costs may be due to the use of lawyers and accountants in order
to avoid that such transactions are restricted by thin capitalization or controlled foreign
company rules (often referred to as CFC rules).11 For external debt these costs may
pertain to informational asymmetries between investors and managers of the ¯rm. As
is common in the literature, we assume that there is an optimal leverage ratio ¹ ®i for
external debt in the absence of taxes (see, e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2004, and Fuest and
Hemmelgarn, 2005). The reason is that external debt is useful in order to discipline
local managers from lax management and \empire-building" strategies. However, if the
leverage ratio goes up, the risk of bankruptcy increases and may cause bankruptcy costs,
or induce a debt-overhang problem that cause local managers to miss good investment
opportunities.12 Starting from a leverage ratio ®i < ¹ ®i; a rise in external debt will
therefore decrease debt costs, whereas the opposite is the case if ®i ¸ ¹ ®i.
It follows from the discussion above that the costs and bene¯ts of internal and external
debt are very di®erent. Internal debt does not restrict the free cash °ow of the ¯rm, nor
does it a®ect the risk of bankruptcy. Neither can the ¯rm bene¯t from the monitoring by
external creditors. As a consequence, internal debt does not tie the hands of managers,
10See for example Mintz and Smart (2004) and Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).
11For a recent survey on US rules see Hau°er and Runkel (2008); and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer
(2008) on the German tax code. Gouthiµ ere (2005) and Dourado and de la Feria (2008) describe thin
capitalization rules for most OECD and EU countries.
12Note that external debt costs can also be a®ected by an increase in the interest rate, which is driven
by an increasing leverage ratio. We omit this in our analysis, but it can be shown that taking such e®ects
into account does not a®ect our main results.
6nor does it reduce any informational asymmetry. Therefore, internal debt should rather
be seen as tax-favored equity.13
In our model, we embed taxation as well as costs of ¯nancial distress and bankruptcy,
but, otherwise, the capital market is assumed to be perfect. This assumption in combi-
nation with our reasoning above leads to that the cost function is additively separable
in external and internal debt, that is C(®i;¾i) = C®(®i) + C¾(¾i).14 We also assume
that the cost function is separable across countries. For internal debt this is not a strong
assumption, since thin capitalization rules varies across countries and do not interact.
For external debt, separability of the cost function across a±liates is invoked in order to
ease exposition, and our main results do not rely on this assumption.15
In the analysis, we assume that the cost function is convex in ® and in ¾. The
convexity related to internal debt (¾) is due to the fact that additional e®ort needs to
be made to conceal the true nature of the transaction from the tax authorities, whilst
the convexity for external debt (®) can be associated with a higher premium due to
informational asymmetries. Formally, the properties applied to the cost function can be
summarized as
Assumption 1 External credit markets are assumed to be perfect except for the debt tax
shield and ¯nancial distress costs. The cost function related to borrowing external and
internal debt in a±liate i is additively separable, C(®i;¾i) = C®(®i)+C¾(¾i), and exhibits
C®(®i) > 0 with C
0
®(®i) > 0; C
00
®(®i) > 0; if ®i ¸ ¹ ®i;
C
0
®(®i) < 0; C
00
®(®i) > 0; if ®i < ¹ ®i;
C¾(¾i) > 0 with C
0
¾(¾i) > 0; C
00
¾(¾i) > 0; if ¾i > 0;
C¾(¾i) = 0 with C
0
¾(¾i) = 0; if ¾i · 0:
It follows from Assumption 1 that there are no costs associated with tax engineering
in the a±liate that conducts internal lending.
4 Optimal Investments
Since MNCs are either owned by many institutional investors, or by shareholders located
in di®erent countries, we assume that the HQ maximizes the value of the MNC after
13Gertner et al. (1994) show that internal debt does not display the same properties as external debt
and that internal debt should be seen as equity. In line with this, Chowdhry and Coval (1998) p. 87f,
and Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) argue that internal debt can be interpreted as tax-favored equity.
14Desai et al (2004a) make the point that separability between internal and external debt does not
hold if capital markets are shallow and underdeveloped.
15An appendix is obtainable upon request from the authors that shows this.
7corporate taxes, neglecting any e®ect that personal taxes may have.16 For the MNC to
structure its production and ¯nancing decisions in the most e±cient manner, it must be
the case that the HQ controls all the a±liates it includes in its maximization problem.
This amounts to assuming that if a±liate i is a joint venture, the sum of minority shares
in a±liate i; that is Ji, is less than ¯fty percent (Ji < 50%8 i).17 The ownership share
in each a±liate is still endogenously given by the cost and gains from having minority











where ¼i is economic pro¯t in subsidiary i; ¼t
i is taxable pro¯t, and ti is the corporate tax
rate in country i: Many countries as well as the European Union use the tax-exemption
principle whereby repatriated dividends to a parent ¯rm are exempted from home taxa-
tion. We shall also assume that the tax-exemption principle applies in our model.18
The pro¯t equation (1) relies on linear pro¯t sharing rules. An alternative to minority
ownership would be to use contractual channels for transferring the capabilities of each
¯rm. Both the MNC and the local ¯rm contribute capabilities to the cooperative joint
venture and we shall assume that it is more costly to transfer these capabilities through
contracts than through shared equity.19 One reason for this can be that it is impossible to
write contracts that cover all contingencies that the cooperation must take into account
(see Gomes-Casseres, 1989).
True economic pro¯t is given by revenue from the sale of an output good minus labor
costs, the user costs of capital and market entry costs,
¼i = F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li ¡ [r + C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji);
where wi is the wage rate. Taxable pro¯t di®ers from true economic pro¯t in that only
labor expenses, borrowing costs and market entry costs are tax deductible. In line with
most countries' tax code, we shall assume that the user costs of equity Ei are not tax
16From the viewpoint of a shareholder in a MNC, maximizing pro¯ts of the MNC after global corporate
taxation and maximizing the net pay-o® on equity investment after opportunity costs and personal
(income) taxes, may yield identical results. This will happen if the personal tax rate on dividends,
capital gains and interest income is the same (see Miller, 1977). Note also that many shareholders in
MNCs are institutional investors who are not liable to personal taxation.
17The same argument is used by Kant (1990) and Konrad and Lommerud (2001). This exogenous
restriction does not a®ect the analysis to come, but it implements the OECD- and IMF-de¯nitions of a
MNC, see Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch. 1.1).
18The use of the exemption principle implies that we do not need to consider where the HQ is located.
The tax exemption principle is given by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in the European Union. Altshuler
and Grubert (2003) study the e®ects of repatriation taxes and the strategies used to avoid them using
US data.
19There is a large literature that discusses when contractual channels are likely to be costlier. This
literature is surveyed in Lax and Sebenius (1986).
8deductible, which means that we can write taxable pro¯t as
¼
t








¡ [C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji):
In de¯ning taxable pro¯t, we have assumed that costs per unit of capital associated
with both external and internal borrowing are tax deductible. Such costs may in part
be associated with informational asymmetries between investors and managers or with
acts in violations of the tax code, and it could be argued that such costs should not be
tax deductible. It is straightforward to show by examination of the equations to follow
that the inclusion of these as tax deductible does not a®ect our results. Rearranging the
expression for taxable pro¯t, we obtain
¼
t
i = F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li ¡ [r ¢ (®i + ¾i) + C®(®i) + C¾(¾i)] ¢ Ki ¡ C
M
i (Ji);









In the next subsections, the objective is to characterize the optimal ¯nancial structure
and production decision of the MNC. Our focal point, however, will be on how the
MNC can legally save tax payments through tax planning and the use of an internal
banking system (¯nancial center). We start by considering the pro¯t maximizing ¯nancial
structure and then proceed by examining optimal supply of the ¯nal good.
4.1 Pro¯t maximizing ¯nancial structure
The maximization procedure of the ¯rm can be seen as a two-tier process where the
¯nancial structure is ¯rst optimized and then, in a second step, the ¯rm decides on how
much of the ¯nal good to produce in each country. Taking real investment Ki (as well as
labor demand Li and minority ownership share Ji) as ¯xed initially, the ¯rm's optimal
¯nancial structure is found by maximizing equation (1). Inserting for ¼i and ¼t
i and
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©
(1 ¡ ti) ¢
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¾i ¢ r ¢ Ki = 0
It is seen from equation (2) that minority ownership in country i reduces the MNC's
share of pro¯t income in country i; but it also increases pro¯t income in country i due
9to the cost reducing e®ect of CM
i (Ji). It does not, however, a®ect the constraint that all
interest payments between a±liates must sum up to zero.










[(1 ¡ Ji) ti ¡ ¸] ¢ r
(1 ¡ Ji)(1 ¡ ti)
¸ 0; 8i; (4)
where ¸ is the Lagrangian multiplier to the maximization problem in equation (2).
The ¯rst order conditions (3) and (4) state that the ¯rm uses both types of debt until
the marginal costs associated with each type of debt are equal to the respective marginal
tax savings. The e®ect of taxation is to reduce the cost of external borrowing as is evident
from equation (3). Due to the external debt tax shield, all a±liates have a tax-induced
optimal leverage ratio of ®¤, which is higher than the optimal external debt ratio in the
absence of taxation de¯ned as ¹ ® (so ®¤ > ¹ ®): Equation (3) also makes clear that the
¯nancial center and all other a±liates are optimally endowed with external debt.
With respect to internal debt, the Lagrangian multiplier ¸ gives the shadow price of
shifted interest expenses, and therefore, allows us to derive which a±liate should conduct
lending operations. In particular, we have:
Lemma 1 De¯ning country 1 as the country with the lowest e®ective tax rate, a tax-







[(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti] = (1 ¡ J1)t1 ´ t
e
1:
Proof. See Appendix A
Lemma 1 states that the MNC maximizes its pro¯t income by using the a±liate
located in country 1 as a basis for its lending operations. We shall in the continuation
refer to this a±liate interchangeably as the ¯nancial center or ¯rm 1. Since ¯rm 1 has
the lowest e®ective tax rate, it is the most attractive place to earn interest income.20
For ¯nancing its operations, the ¯nancial center borrows external debt (DE
1 ) according
to equation (3), and is endowed with the optimal amount of equity E1 from its HQ. In
return, the HQ reduces its equity Ei in all a±liates i > 1, and concentrates it in the
¯nancial center so that all internal lending is conducted from it. By doing so, the HQ
maximizes the net tax savings from debt shifting, that is, the di®erence between the
values of the interest tax deductions and the corresponding tax obligation in the lending
a±liate. The latter is a cost element that is minimized by conducting lending from the
20This a±liate could be interpreted as a ¯nancial center with preferential tax treatment. However,
none of our results depend on the existence of a preferential tax regime, or the existence of a pure
¯nancial center.
10a±liate in the country with the lowest e®ective rate of tax. It follows from this that it
is the borrowing a±liates that bene¯t from debt shifting, since the interest deductions
increase their after-tax income. As a consequence, the gain from debt shifting accrues
only in the borrowing a±liates.
It should be pointed out that the lending activities in the ¯nancial center are running
an economic loss (¼1¡t¼t
1 < 0), since the equity cost is not tax deductible whilst interest
income is taxed. Based on accounting values, however, the low-tax a±liate is running a
book surplus (¼t
1 > 0), since the return to equity is not deducted as a cost. The loss in
the a±liate in country 1 from internal lending equals ¡EI
1 ¢t1r; which is the opportunity
cost of equity multiplied by the tax rate.21 However, borrowing a±liates can deduct the
interest cost of internal debt against a higher tax rate than the tax rate in country 1.
For the MNC as a whole, then, the loss by the lending a±liate in country 1 is more than
o®set by tax savings in borrowing a±liates.
The ¯nancial center could have had a surplus if we had allowed the MNC to shift
pro¯t by interest rate di®erentials. We have deliberately not embedded transfer pricing
into the model in order to focus purely on tax planning and leverage decisions, but it can
be shown that including transfer pricing in our model does not a®ect the incentives to
avoid taxes through the use of debt.22
In order to see how tax policy a®ects debt structure, we ¯nd by implicit di®erentiation












(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ (1 ¡ ti) + [(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti ¡ te
1]
(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ (1 ¡ ti)2 ¢ C
00
¾(¾i)










where (1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti ¡ te
1 > 0 due to Lemma 1.
As seen from (5) and (6), an increase in the domestic tax rate ti increases marginal tax
savings from tax-deductible debt in country i and leads the ¯rm to increase its leverage
ratio of both types of debt (i.e., higher ®i and ¾i). In contrast, an increase in the e®ective
tax rate of the low-tax country (te
1) makes tax avoidance through internal debt more
expensive because the shifted interest payments now bear a higher tax burden in the
¯nancial center. Consequently, the use of internal debt decreases in all a±liates as shown
in equation (7).23 It follows from conditions (5) to (7), then, that a±liates in high-tax
21Omitting sales and leverage costs (C®) in the ¯nancial center for the purpose of showing this, eco-















where lending is re¯nanced by external debt or equity, L1 = DE
1 +EI




22See Schindler and Schjelderup (2011).
23Note that the e®ective tax rate te
1 does not a®ect external debt as long as external and internal debt
11jurisdictions have higher internal debt ratios than a±liates in low-tax jurisdictions.
If we compare a±liates of MNCs to purely domestic ¯rms, the latter cannot engage
in cross country tax planning. As a consequence, their internal debt ratios are zero.
Therefore, a±liates of MNCs with tax-e±cient ¯nancial structures have higher overall
debt ratios than domestic ¯rms in the same industry, since external debt ratios are the
same for all ¯rms within the same country as long as Assumption 1 holds.
Turning to the central issue of how minority ownership a®ects the leverage structure








¾(¾i) ¢ (1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ (1 ¡ ti)
< 0; i > 1: (8)
Equation (8) shows that minority ownership dampens the incentive to use internal
debt as a tax minimizing strategy. As explained after Lemma 1, the gains from the debt
tax shield occur in the borrowing a±liates i > 1; and bene¯t all owners according to their
ownership stake. However, minority owners in these a±liates do not take part in paying
any of the tax obligations that arise from the funding activities of the ¯nancial center.24
Hence, the MNC bears the full ¯nancing costs, but cannot internalize the full gain from
the debt tax shield in the borrowing a±liates. This gives rise to a classic externality
where minority ownership dampens the incentives to use debt in a±liates with minority
owners. Our theoretical result is in line with BÄ uttner and Wamser (2007), who ¯nd
empirical evidence for that the level of internal debt decreases with minority ownership
(see section 2). If the e®ective tax rate in the ¯nancial center is zero (te
1 = 0) there are
no tax payments on shifted interest income, and, therefore, the externality is eliminated
as seen from equation (8), d¾i=dJi = 0.
Equation (8) should be contrasted with equation (7), which shows that if the minority
ownership rate rises in the low-tax a±liate (i.e., the ¯nancial center), tax planning by
debt goes up in all borrowing a±liates. The reason is that the loss incurred by the
¯nancial center is then to a larger extent borne by its minority owners making it less
costly to fund tax planning by debt.
The e®ect of minority ownership on the tax-sensitivity of internal debt can be found












¾(¾i) ¢ (1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ (1 ¡ ti)2 < 0; i > 1: (9)
are separable in the debt cost function (see Assumption 1).
24In fact, as we show later, the ¯nancial center will be wholly owned by the MNC. The reason is that
it is running a de¯cit so there are no gains to minority owners from holding a stake in this a±liate. Note
that if the MNC had also engaged in transfer pricing, allowing minority owners to hold a stake in the
¯nancial center would not be optimal from the MNCs perspective, since it would reduce the gains from
transfer pricing to the MNC.
12Equation (9) shows that the larger is the minority ownership rate Ji; the smaller is
the tax sensitivity of internal debt to a change in the host country tax rate. The intuition
is again the presence of the externality from asymmetric sharing of bene¯ts and costs,
as pointed out above. Although this result has not been shown theoretically before, it
has been veri¯ed empirically by Hebous and Weichenrieder (2010), BÄ uttner and Wamser
(2007), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), and Desai et al. (2004b) (see also section 2).25
It is worthwhile to point out that the results in equations (8) and (9) show that
minority ownership curbs tax planning by debt. This result di®ers from the main ¯ndings
in the transfer pricing literature, where a main insight is that minority ownership induces
the majority owner to shift income by transfer prices away from the a±liate with minority
owners. Therefore, minority ownership aggravates transfer pricing and tax evasion (see
Kant, 1988, 1990). Our result, however, is the opposite. Minority ownership leads to less
tax planning, since the multinational ¯rm dampens the externality from joint ownership
by shifting less debt. The economic reasoning, however, is the same as in the transfer
pricing literature. In both cases the multinational ¯rm would like to avoid sharing pro¯t
income with minority owners.
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i ¡ (1 ¡ ti) ¢ C¾(¾
¤
i): (11)
For ti > te
1=(1 ¡ Ji) we have ¾¤
i > 0 and Ãi(ti;te
1;Ji) > 0, where the latter stems from
C¾ being strictly convex for all ¾¤ > 0. Applying analogous arguments, we infer from











and the maximum net gain from external debt per unit capital invested becomes
°i(ti) = ti ¢ r ¢ ®
¤
i ¡ (1 ¡ ti) ¢ C®(®
¤
i) > 0: (13)
25Note that Desai et al. (2004b) in their Table 2 (columns 3 and 4) compare the e®ect of taxes on
the reported pro¯tability of partially owned and wholly owned a±liates. They ¯nd that \the reported
pro¯tability of partially owned a±liates is considerably less sensitive to local tax rates than is the reported
pro¯tability of wholly owned a±liates." In their analysis `partially owned' includes a±liates that are both
majority- and minority-owned by the MNC. When they distinguish between the two groups they ¯nd
that the reduced tax sensitivity is most robust for majority-owned a±liates, i.e., a±liates with minority
owners in our setting. In our analysis we have ruled out the case where the MNC is a minority owner in
an a±liate.
134.2 Optimal real investment and production
Given optimal values ®¤
i and ¾¤
i, and therefore optimal net gain functions for external
and internal debt (°i and Ãi), the e®ective capital cost (~ r) after taxation in a±liate i is
given by
~ ri = r ¡ ti ¢ r ¢ ®
¤









¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i + (1 ¡ ti) ¢ C¾(¾
¤
i): (14)
It is straightforward to simplify this expression to
~ ri = r ¡ °i(ti) ¡ Ãi(ti;t
e
1;Ji):
Using the optimal ¯nancial strategies and e®ective capital costs, equations (10) to
(14), in the pro¯t function of the MNC, the maximization problem for the choice of





(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ f(1 ¡ ti)
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¡ [r ¡ °(ti) ¡ Ãi(ti;t
e
1;Ji);] ¢ Kig: (15)
The ¯rst order conditions are given by
F
i














where the two last terms on the right hand side of equation (17) are the tax savings
due to the use of external and internal debt. It is seen that these tax savings reduce
the user costs of capital. Therefore, we can conclude that a±liates of MNCs with tax-
e±cient ¯nancial structures have lower costs of capital and thus invest more in capital
than comparable domestic ¯rms (within the same industry), since domestic ¯rms cannot
utilize internal debt. Furthermore, the higher the corporate tax rate, the larger is the
subsidy from debt on the user costs of capital.
Equations (16) and (17) also enable us to derive the marginal rate of technical sub-



















Equation (18) suggests that if the wage rate is the same across all ¯rms, MNCs have a
higher MRTS than domestic ¯rms because the ¯nancing costs (denominator) are lower.
As argued by Lipsey (2004), there is an extensive literature showing that MNCs on
14average pay higher wages than domestic ¯rms. If this is the case and since the ¯nancing
costs in MNCs are lower than in domestic ¯rms, the MRTS will be larger in MNCs.
Empirical evidence from a number of countries suggests that this is the case and that
accordingly MNCs have a higher capital to employee ratio than national ¯rms.26
It is worth pointing out that the e®ects described in equations (17) and (18) should be
weaker in case of shared ownership, since internal debt is less attractive and capital costs
are higher compared to wholly owned subsidiaries (Ji = 0) within the same industry.
5 Optimal Minority Ownership Share
The sharing of ownership creates both costs and bene¯ts, and in this section we analyze
how these determine the optimal minority ownership share. As an intermediate step,






(1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i > 0; i > 1: (19)
Equation (19) shows that the e®ective user costs of capital ~ r rise in a±liate i > 1 when
the minority ownership rate goes up. The reason is that a higher minority ownership share
Ji in a±liate i > 1 makes internal debt less attractive. Consequently, internal leverage
¾i falls. This in turn increases the user costs of capital. As will be clear later, this has
implications for the ownership structure.







> 0; i > 1: (20)






¢ r ¢ ¾
¤
i < 0; i > 1: (21)
Equation (21) shows that the e®ective interest costs ~ ri for a±liates i > 1 would fall
if the ¯nancial center had minority owners and their share of ownership increased. The
reason is that a larger part of the costs arising in the ¯nancial center would be borne by
its minority owners making the use of internal debt cheaper. This would lead to higher
leverage ratios in a±liates i > 1 and would cause the user costs of capital for a±liates
i > 1 to fall.
The results in (21) do not hold for the ¯nancial center. For i = 1, the internal leverage
26For a survey of empirical evidence related to capital to labor ratios and factor markets see Navaretti
and Venables (2004, ch. 7).




From equation (22) we see that the costs of capital in the ¯nancial center are inde-
pendent of internal leverage, since the ¯nancial center's lending activities give rise to tax
payments instead of tax reductions.
The optimal minority ownership shares now follow from maximizing after-tax pro¯ts,
given optimal labor and capital demand, L¤
i and K¤
i , and a tax-e±cient ¯nancing structure


















¡ ~ ri(Ji;J1) ¢ K
¤
i g: (23)
Starting with the ¯rst order condition for minority ownership share in the ¯nancial


















i ¡ (1 ¡ J1)
@CM
1
@J1 | {z }
(¡)
¸ 0: (24)
In equation (24), the second and third term are positive and display the marginal bene¯ts
of having a higher minority ownership share. The second term is the marginal bene¯t from
a reduction in the e®ective costs of capital in all a±liates except for the ¯nancial center,
while the third term is the marginal reduction in market entry costs by the ¯nancial
center. The ¯rst term is the cost of sharing after tax pro¯t with minority owners. If the
¯nancial center is running a de¯cit, equation (24) is strictly positive meaning that the
MNC would like to have a minority ownership share as high as possible. However, since
the ¯nancial center is running an economic de¯cit (see the discussion after Lemma 1),
taking a positive equity stake in the ¯nancial center is not pro¯table for minority owners.
Hence, it is wholly owned.
For all a±liates except for the ¯nancial center (i.e., a±liates i > 1), each a±liate's op-
























where xi = F(K¤
i ;L¤
i) denotes optimal production.
Equation (25) balances the costs and bene¯ts of having minority owners. The RHS
of equation (25) is the bene¯t from having minority owners. The bene¯t arises since
minority owners cause a reduction in marginal entry costs (@CM
i =@Ji < 0): The LHS is
16the marginal cost from minority ownership. Minority ownership is costly since minority
shareholders receive part of the a±liate's pro¯t. This e®ect is captured by the ¯rst term
on the LHS. The second cost term on the LHS is new to the literature and is due to the
fact that minority ownership increases the e®ective costs of capital.
In order to derive the optimal ownership share we shall de¯ne the entry cost elasticity
with respect to minority ownership as "CM










> 0, and let the
production elasticities be "xiai = (@Fi=@ai) ¢ (ai=xi) > 0; ai = fLi;Kig. Applying these
de¯nitions as well as as the interest rate elasticity (20) in equation (25), after having
substituted optimal labor and capital demand from equations (16) and (17), it follows
that
xi ¡ "xiLixi ¡ C
M







i ¡ "xiKixi "~ riJi
i
:











xi ¡ "~ riJi ¢ "xiKi





Before discussing the implications of equation (26), it is useful to note that the lower
bound for optimal minority ownership is Ji = 0, even if the fraction on the RHS is negative
in equation (26). As discussed in Section 3, in order for the HQ to set up a tax-e±cient
¯nancial structure for the MNC, it must have control of its a±liates. Consequently,
minority owners must own less than 50 percent of any a±liate (i.e., Ji < 50%). Thus,
there is also an upper bound on the optimal minority ownership share. From equation
(26), we see that the optimal minority ownership share Ji, i > 1, is higher the more
e®ective it is in reducing market entry costs, i.e., the larger is "CM
i Ji. It is lower, the
larger is pro¯t income in a±liate i (i.e., the larger is the denominator). Optimal minority
ownership also falls (all else equal), the more it increases the e®ective user costs of capital,
"~ riJi > 0, and the more the resulting decrease in capital employed causes production to
fall (i.e., "xiKi > 0).
6 Discussion
Our analysis has demonstrated that when it is pro¯table to form a joint venture, debt
shifting entails a transfer from the MNC to its minority owners, since the subsidiary's
capital costs are subsidized by the ¯nancial center, which is wholly owned by the parent.
Our study has not taken into account the potential e®ect of thin capitalization rules
(TC rules). Such rules imply a cap on the amount of tax deductible (internal) debt, and
could either be interpreted as increasing the costs of internal debt or as explicit caps on the
use of internal debt.27 Either type of rule would reduce the leverage ratio of internal debt
27In the U.S., corporations whose debt-to-equity ratio is in excess of 1.5:1, and which pay interest on
17and lead to higher e®ective capital costs and reduce the use of debt. Other things being
equal, this would also reduce real investment. Including such rules in our analysis would,
however, not change our results qualitatively as long as the MNC has some discretion in
terms of manipulating its leverage ratio. Formally, more binding TC rules imply more
convex cost functions C¾(¾i) and, thus, higher marginal tax-engineering costs. From the
¯rst-order condition (4), it then follows that the internal leverage will decrease. It is
straightforward, however, to see that this does not a®ect any of our comparative static
results. An interesting insight that follows from our analysis is that in countries with
more restrictive TC rules, minority ownership shares, all else equal, should on average
be higher. The reason is that the fall in internal debt following from e®ective TC rules
decreases the sensitivity of the e®ective capital costs related to minority ownership, see
equation (19). This reduces the ¯nancing externality from minority ownership.
The e®ects of TC rules have recently been examined by BÄ uttner et al. (2008) and
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008). Both studies ¯nd that TC rules decrease (inter-
company) loans and increase equity. They disagree, however, on the real e®ects. BÄ uttner
et al. (2008) ¯nd that TC rules have a negative impact on real investments. In contrast,
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) ¯nd no e®ect on real investment, and argue that
the reason is that MNCs have various strategies to circumvent TC rules. One strategy
they describe in detail is the use of holding company structures (see Weichenrieder and
Windischbauer, 2008, section 5 for the details). One reason for the divergence in ¯ndings
related to real e®ects may be that BÄ uttner et al. (2008) use data for German outbound
investments, whilst Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) use German inbound in-
vestment data. From a theoretical point of view, the relevance of strict TC rules has
been challenged by Hau°er and Runkel (2008), who show that weakening TC rules is a
dominant strategy in corporate tax competition among countries.
Nor have we investigated the use of so called CFC rules and the impact they may have
on our analysis. Under such rules, income from subsidiaries is taxed in the home country
of the MNC and, as a consequence, the exemption principle does not apply. Taxation
under CFC rules mostly requires that the income earned is deemed to be passive and
that the taxation level is below a certain level (i.e., earned in a low-tax jurisdiction).28
In our model, tighter CFC rules can be interpreted as more convex cost functions for
tax-engineering. If CFC rules are so e®ective that they cannot be circumvented, they
reproduce the home country tax system. Then, the MNC would serve as ¯nancial center
and incentives for debt shifting to lower taxed a±liates would vanish. This would in
our model imply that the marginal costs of using internal debt would become in¯nitely
debt owed to, or guaranteed by, certain non-US a±liates are subject to the earnings stripping limitations
of interest deduction (see SEC. 163 (j), IRC). In Germany, the tax deductibility of interest expenses are
limited to 3% of an a±liate's pre-tax earnings.
28See Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009), section 2, on how the German tax code de¯nes passive and active
income.
18high in such a±liates. However, debt shifting to a±liates being taxed at higher rates
than the parent ¯rm would still be possible and pro¯table. If CFC rules are not strictly
binding, marginal costs of internal debt are increased, but still ¯nite. Then, the use of
internal debt will be reduced in all a±liates, but this would not change our result in any
qualitative way.
Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) argue that German CFC rules are e®ective in reducing
passive investments (i.e., setting up ¯nancial centers), particularly in low-tax jurisdictions
outside the EU. Benelux Countries such as Belgium have set up special tax systems for
¯nancial centers that make them escape CFC taxation. This may explain why Ruf and
Weichenrieder (2009) ¯nd that a substantial number of MNCs have their ¯nancial centers
located in the Benelux countries (see also Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008). Countries that
o®er tailor-made tax systems for ¯nancial centers would imply that adding CFC rules to
our model would not a®ect our results qualitatively. In a world where such loopholes did
not exists, however, tax incentives for debt shifting would be less pronounced.
7 Conclusions
We develop a model that allows a MNC to determine its leverage and ownership structure
endogenously. Our main result is that a±liates with partial ownership have less debt than
wholly owned a±liates and, therefore, have a higher rental rate of capital and a less tax-
e±cient ¯nancing structure. The reason is that a MNC cannot reap the full bene¯t of its
debt shifting strategy when the value of tax savings must be shared with minority owners
who do not in an equal manner contribute to the funding of such tax planning activities.
We also show that a±liates of MNCs have higher internal and overall debt ratios and
lower rental rates of physical capital than comparable domestic ¯rms. Our ¯ndings are in
line with some recent empirical results showing that changes in corporate tax rates have
less of an e®ect on debt-to-asset ratios in joint ventures than in wholly owned a±liates
of MNCs.
We have also shown in this paper that there are qualitative di®erences between debt
shifting and pro¯t shifting in joint ventures. Debt shifting activities by MNCs in joint
ventures are dampened by minority ownership due to the externality related to the ¯-
nancing of internal debt. In contrast, under transfer pricing minority ownership gives the
headquarters of a MNC incentives to shift income away from minority owners by mis-
pricing intra-¯rm transactions. This leads us to conclude that joint ventures can be used
to curb debt shifting activities. At the same time joint ventures encourage mispricing
of intra-¯rm transactions. On balance, therefore, more research is needed on the joint
e®ects of debt shifting and transfer pricing before policy recommendations can be passed.
19A Proof of Lemma 1
Note that it must be (1¡Ji) ti ¡¸ ¸ 0 from C
0
¾(¾i) ¸ 0 and FOC (4). Assume now that
the condition holds with equality for an arbitrary a±liate j, i.e., ¸ = (1 ¡ Jj) tj = te
j.
However, this will violate FOC (4) as long as there are a±liates having a lower e®ective
tax rate te
i < te
j = ¸. Thus, the optimality condition can only be ful¯lled if ¸ = mini te
i =
mini[(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ ti] = (1 ¡ J1)t1:
Country 1 is then a low-tax country in the sense that the e®ective tax payments for
the MNC are lower in this country than in others. Thus, te
1 = (1 ¡ J1) t1 < (1 ¡ Ji) ti =
te
i 8 i 6= 1. Accordingly, the ¯nancial center should be located in this country in order to
minimize tax payments on shifted interest payments and to maximize tax savings.
B Appendix B
In this Appendix, we show that our results can be reproduced if we let the basis for
partial ownership be productivity enhancing rather than reducing market entry costs (as
in the main section of our paper). We start with the same model as in section 2 of the
paper, i.e., a MNC runs i a±liates, producing a homogenous good x by employing capital
Ki and labor Li. Capital is ¯nanced by equity Ei, external debt DE
i and internal debt
DI
i, i.e., Ki = Ei + DE
i + DI
i. Expenses for costs of equity cannot be deducted in the
corporate tax base.
Minority ownership increases production and sales by improving access of an a±liate
i to the domestic market and to the supply chain, say (see discussion in section 3 of the
paper). Hence, minority ownership Ji can be interpreted as an additional production
factor and the production function of good x in a±liate i can be written as
xi(Li;Ki;Ji) = F(Li;Ki;Ji); (27)







> 0; ai = fLi;Ki;Jig: (28)
The tax-e±cient ¯nancial structure is not a®ected by how the gain from partial own-
ership is modeled, so the results derived in subsection 4.1 in the paper as well as the
e®ective interest rate ~ ri in a±liate i is still given by equation (13) as follows
~ ri = r ¡ ti ¢ r ¢ ®
¤
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¤
i + (1 ¡ ti) ¢ C¾(¾
¤
i): (29)
20The pro¯t maximization problem with respect to optimal investment and optimal






(1 ¡ Ji) ¢ f(1 ¡ ti)[F(Ki;Li) ¡ wi ¢ Li] ¡ ~ ri ¢ Kigs.t. (29): (30)
The ¯rst-order-condition for optimal labor demand in a±liate i is
(1 ¡ Ji)f(1 ¡ ti)FLi ¡ (1 ¡ ti)wig = 0 (31)
and, by applying the de¯nition of the production elasticity of labor, equation (28), the







Accordingly, optimal labor demand is increasing in optimal production xi, in the pro-
ductivity of labor ("xiLi) and it is decreasing in the wage rate wi. Optimal real capital
demand is derived from
(1 ¡ Ji)f(1 ¡ ti)FKi ¡ ~ rg = 0; (33)
which can be used to derive
K
¤




Optimal capital demand is increasing in optimal production and the productivity of
capital. It decreases in the e®ective costs of capital ~ ri; and ceteris paribus, in the tax
rate ti, because not all capital costs are tax deductible.














Indeed, an a±liate of a MNC will have a higher capital intensity than a comparable
purely domestic ¯rm, if the production elasticities are the same in both ¯rms (e.g., if the
production function is Cobb-Douglas) and given that the wage rate in a MNC does not
decrease more than e®ective costs of capital. This is in line with our discussion on page
14 in the paper and equation (35) above amends and replaces equation (18).
Turning to optimal minority ownership, we derive as an intermediate step the e®ect
of minority ownership on e®ective capital costs ~ ri = ~ ri(Ji;J1). Relying on equation (14)






(1 ¡ Ji)2 ¢ r ¢ ¾
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i > 0: (36)
This e®ect is identical to the entry-cost case in the paper and we de¯ne the elasticity of
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i < 0; i > 1; (38)





Finally, the interesting ¯rst-order-condition is the one for optimal minority ownership
share in a±liates i > 1, which implies after reordering






Ki = (1 ¡ Ji)(1 ¡ ti)FJi: (40)
























Applying the de¯nitions of the production elasticities, equation (28), as well as the inter-
est rate elasticity, that is equation (37), and substituting for optimal labor and capital






















"xiJi ¡ "xiKi "~ riJi
1 ¡ "xiLi ¡ "xiKi
(43)
in a±liate i > 1; where 1 ¡ "xiLi ¡ "xiKi > 0 as long as the production function has
non-increasing returns to scale. The discussion and interpretations follows the same lines
as in section 5.
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